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Abstract  
 
Using a sample of SMEs from 28 European countries, this study evaluates the input and output 
additionality of national and EU R&D programmes both separately and in combination. 
Accordingly, we contribute to understanding the effectiveness of policy mix, in this case of 
innovation policy from the perspective of multi-level governance. Empirical results are quite 
different for innovation inputs and innovation outputs. For innovation inputs, we found positive 
treatment effects from both national and EU programmes separately as well as complementary 
effects for firms supported from both sources relative to firms supported only by national 
programmes. For innovation outputs, we report no evidence of additionality from national 
programmes and cannot reject crowding out from EU programmes. However, crowding out 
from EU support is eliminated by combination with national support. These findings have 
policy implications for the governance of R&D policy and suggest that the European Paradox 
– success of EU support in promoting R&D inputs but not commercialisation – is not yet 
mitigated. 
 
Keywords: R&D support; SMEs; Policy mix; Input and output additionality; European 
Paradox 
1. Introduction  
 
Innovation policy has taken centre stage among policy makers in the European Union (EU) 
(Edler et al. 2012a; European Commission 2010). Small and medium-sized enterprises are 
regarded as the engine of growth in the European economy (European Commission 2013). 
Correspondingly, policy makers not only recognize the importance of innovation and its public 
support, but increasingly recognize the relevance of evaluating the impact of support measures 
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(Edler et al. 2012b), including for SMEs (Radicic et al. 2015). The complexity of innovation 
policies is actuated by the broadening of policy domains. More specifically, implementation of 
innovation policies is practically conducted at different administrative levels: local; regional; 
national; and supra-national (European Union) (Magro and Wilson 2013; Vītola 2015). The 
implication is that a wide range of policy measures implemented at all administrative levels 
interact with one another (Magro and Wilson 2013). Given the interaction between various 
innovation instruments implemented at different administrative levels but in the same 
geographical area, difficulties arise in evaluating individual policy measures. Therefore, there 
is an emerging need for systemic evaluation, which takes into account interactions and 
interdependencies of modern innovation policies (Magro and Wilson 2013; Vītola 2015): “… 
an evaluation approach needs to be able to cover the interplay of measures as well as individual 
measures” (Edler et al. 2012b, p.7).1 
This study evaluates the individual and joint impacts of national and international (EU) 
R&D programmes on innovation in European small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In 
assessing policy effects, the study adopts the approach introduced in Czarnitzki and Lopes-
Bento (2014) and Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015) in relation to the presence of “hidden treatment”. 
Namely, firms could be recipients of more than one R&D and innovation policy. In this setting 
of multi-treatments, individual programmes’ effects might be overestimated when the 
interactions between different innovation policies are not addressed (Guerzoni and Raiteri 
2015). However, interactions between policies and policy instruments have received little 
attention with respect to either theory development or empirical investigation (Cunningham et 
al. 2013a). To address the issue of hidden treatment, our empirical strategy takes into account 
the interaction between national and EU R&D programmes. Naturally, other innovation policy 
instruments, particularly from the demand-side (such as public procurement and innovation 
vouchers), could affect firms’ innovation inputs and outputs (Guerzoni and Raiteri 2015). 
However, our survey data does not contain information on other potential hidden treatments, 
which is why we focus on the interplay between national and EU R&D programmes. In 
evaluating the interplay between national and EU R&D programmes, we contribute to the scant 
empirical literature on innovation “policy mix” (Vītola 2015), defined as the balance and 
interactions among policy interventions (OECD 2010). 
                                                          
1 Martin (2016) identifies four major trends in our thinking about innovation: from the linear model to systems of 
innovation; from national to multi-level governance; from individual research to networking and cooperation; and 
from individual policies to policy mixes. Our empirical strategy is part of this most recent trend. 
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 The central question within the evaluation debate is related to the effectiveness of public 
subsidies, i.e. whether firms increase their innovative efforts as a result of public intervention 
(additionality) or substitute their private investment with public funding (crowding out) (David 
and Hall 2000; David et al. 2000). The type of additionality effect is contingent on the phase 
of the innovation process that is affected by the provision of public support: input additionality 
refers to whether public support measures induce larger investment in R&D and other 
innovation inputs relative to firms' private funding in the absence of public support 
programmes; output additionality occurs when public support results in larger innovation 
output, such as increasing patent applications, and/or the introduction of technological and non-
technological innovations; and, behavioural additionality arises when policy instruments 
induce changes in firms' innovative behaviour (Falk 2007; OECD 2006a). In line with an 
increasing demand for systemic evaluation, one recommendation is that all three types of 
additionality should be explored in an integrated approach (Gök and Edler 2012; Margo and 
Wilson 2013). To reflect this emerging practice, the focus of this study is on assessing both 
input and output additionality. We are not able to investigate behavioural additionality, because 
of lack of information in the data.  
 Finally, SMEs innovate differently than do large firms. Yet very few studies examine 
the effectiveness of public support measures on innovation in the context of SMEs. This study 
aims to fill this gap by examining the impact of national and EU R&D policy support on SME 
innovation. Drawing on a sample of European SMEs, we utilize a matching estimator to 
estimate treatment effects of R&D programmes on innovation inputs and outputs. Our second 
contribution is to evaluate whether public support measures are complementary in supporting 
different phases of innovation processes (innovation inputs and outputs) and at different 
governance levels. So far, only the study by Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) tackled these 
issues empirically, although not in the context of SMEs. The third contribution is that our study 
contributes to the evidence base on the “European paradox” (European Commission 1995) by 
showing that it applies to SMEs in particular; we find that EU support for SMEs promotes input 
additionality but not output additionality.  
 The study is organized as follows. The next section discusses the emergence of policy 
mix and a consequent need for systemic evaluation, followed by the review of empirical studies 
on input and output additionality. Section 3 provides an overview of the matching estimator 
and the dataset used in the study and specifies the empirical model. Section 4 presents and 
discusses empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Theoretical considerations and literature review  
2.1. Policy mix and systemic evaluation  
 
 Economic theory advances two complementary rationales for public intervention in the 
domain of innovation: the market failure rationale; and the evolutionary, system-failure 
rationale. From the late 1950s onwards, the market failure rationale has provided a basis for 
policy instruments designed either to lower the costs of private R&D and innovation activities 
or to raise the payoff from knowledge creation (Smith 2000). The second, evolutionary system-
failure rationale broadened the scope of public intervention by addressing failures in the 
functioning of innovation systems (Arnold 2004; Smith 2000). Whilst the market-failure 
rationale emphasizes the importance of investing in science and technology, the evolutionary-
systemic rationale focuses on the interaction of organizations and institutions within systems 
of innovation. Therefore, the innovation policy domain is characterized by the existence of 
complementary policy rationales, accompanied by a complementary mix of policy instruments. 
From the perspective of current innovation policy, both rationales are valid and contribute to 
policy design and implementation (Bleda and del Río 2013; OECD 1998). To reflect the 
widening of policy rationales and a proliferation of various policy instruments, the concept of 
the innovation “policy mix” has recently emerged (Belitz and Lejpras 2016; Flanagan et al. 
2011; OECD 2010). 
Public measures aimed at supporting and promoting innovation are divided into two 
broad categories: supply-side public measures; and demand-side measures. Boekholt (2010, p. 
334) defines a policy instrument as 'a government measure or programme that aims to change 
the behaviour and actions of the actors involved in the whole process from generating new 
ideas into innovative market introductions and solutions'. Supply-side measures stem from the 
first-generation linear innovation models, and have been the dominant category of public 
intervention in the domain of innovation since the market-failure rationale was advanced in 
theory and practice (Edler and Georghiou 2007). The second generation of demand-pull 
innovation models shifted the focus to the demand side of the innovation process but, at the 
same time, ignored the role of firms' technological capabilities in the innovation process 
(Nemet 2009). Demand-side public measures were designed after the formalization of the third-
generation interactive or coupling innovation models, bringing together the technology-push 
and the demand-pull arguments (Kline and Rosenberg 1986). 
As innovation policies evolved from one generation to another, new instruments were 
launched but existing instruments were seldom abolished (Boekholt 2010; Margo and Wilson 
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2013). That is one of the reasons why nowadays a large number of public measures exists. 
Consequently, the evolution of policies related to innovation resulted in the shift in policy-
making focus, from identifying the best policy instruments to formalizing a portfolio of 
instruments that will have a joint positive impact on innovation. A policy mix can be defined 
as 'the combination of policy instruments, which interact to influence the quantity and quality 
of R&D investment in public and private sectors' (Boekholt 2010, p. 353). Finding a holistic 
solution based on the policy mix is not an easy task, as the synergetic effects of policy 
instruments might amplify or cancel individual positive effects. The complexity of innovation 
policies stemming from different rationales, objectives and dimensions makes system 
evaluation rather difficult. In that sense, evaluation of innovation policy is underdeveloped 
relative to innovation theory (Magro and Wilson 2013). This is in line with the conclusion in 
Flanagan et al. (2011, p.711): ‘A key role for innovation policy studies should be to highlight 
the trade-offs and tensions inherent in any policy mix and to promote open debates about them.’ 
The European Commission, in its Green Paper on Innovation (European Commission 
1995), identified the “European Paradox” as the main weakness of the innovation system of 
the European Union relative to those of the US and Japan (Dosi et al. 2006; Hammadou et al. 
2014). The paradox refers to the inability of the EU to transform ‘...the results of technological 
research and skills into innovations and competitive advantage’ (European Commission 1995, 
p.5). Following Hammadou et al. (2014), the European Innovation System is effective in 
producing basic research, stimulated mainly by public spending on R&D, but less effective in 
producing innovation outputs, whether from the technological aspect or from the commercial 
aspect. In other words, there is an innovation gap insofar as public support spurs innovation 
inputs (R&D) but not innovation outputs (OECD 2012). The traditional, supply-side, policy 
measures have been a dominant type of R&D and innovation policy across EU Member States 
and at the EU level since the 1950s. However, these measures have not been successful in 
mitigating the European Paradox (OECD 2010; 2012). Nowadays, EU policy makers are 
putting more emphasis on demand-side measures, predominantly public procurement, hoping 
that the rather disappointing effectiveness of the supply-side measures will be complemented 
by the effects of demand-side interventions (OECD 2010; 2012). 
 
2.2. Types of additionality 
 
 Additionality refers to an increase in firms' innovation activity as a result of public 
intervention. Conversely, crowding out occurs when firms replace their private investment in 
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innovation with public funding (David and Hall 2000; David et al. 2000). Crowding out is 
further categorized into full crowding out (firms' private funding completely substituted by 
public investment) and partial crowding out (firms reduce their private investment in 
innovation, but not to the extent of public funding received) (Aerts and Schmidt 2008; Gonzáles 
and Pazó 2008). A partial crowding-out effect can only be hypothesised when the amounts of 
subsidies are available, which is rare in innovation studies (Radicic et al. 2015). Hence, most 
studies are limited to testing the hypothesis of additionality versus a full crowding out effect. 
In this respect, our study is not an exception, as the amount of subsidies is not available in our 
dataset. 
An important shortcoming of input additionality is its focus on the allocation of 
resources, without exploring the effects of public intervention on innovation outputs and 
changes in firms' innovative behaviour (Antonioli and Marzucchi 2012). For this reason, this 
study assesses both input and output additionality, thus contributing to a more systematic 
evaluation of R&D and innovation policy. Regarding output additionality, innovation output 
indicators can be categorized into two groups: intermediate (direct) innovation outputs (such 
as patents and publications); and indirect innovation outputs, such as the introduction of 
product and process innovations and the share of sales from new products and/or processes (i.e. 
innovative sales) (Clarysse et al. 2009). 
  
2.3. Literature review  
 
 Arvanitis (2013), in line with Cerulli (2010), notes that there is no commonly accepted 
theory of public support to explain the selection process, because the process itself is specific 
and hinges on objectives set by the government. This could be the reason why David and Hall 
(2000), David et al. (2000) and Dimos and Pugh (2016) suggest that, theoretically, both 
treatment effects (additionality and crowding out) are possible, thus leaving resolution to 
empirical analysis.  
 Input additionality is the subject of the largest number of studies (Clarysse et al. 2009; 
Cunningham et al. 2013b). Notwithstanding a large volume of empirical studies, overall 
evidence about input additionality remains inconclusive; evidence of a positive treatment effect 
seems to prevail (García-Quevedo 2004; Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014), although this is typically 
very small (Radicic et al. 2015). Focusing on the differential impact of public support by firm 
size, several studies (e.g. Alecke et al. 2012; Gonzáles et al. 2005; Gonzáles and Pazó 2008; 
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Herrera and Sánchez-Gonzáles 2012) provide evidence that input additionality is likely to be 
found in SMEs.  
 Fewer studies investigate output additionality, although their number has grown in 
recent years (Clarysse et al. 2009; Cunningham et al. 2013b). Most studies report positive 
output additionality. In terms of how innovation outputs are operationalized, propensity to 
patenting or patent counts, as a measure of intermediate output, and innovative sales, as a 
measure of market success of innovation, are most frequently utilized (e.g. Arvanitis et al. 
2010; Herrera and Sanchez-Gonzales 2012; Hewitt-Dundas and Roper 2010; Hussinger 2008). 
Focusing specifically on SMEs, Foreman-Peck (2013) assesses output additionality in 
manufacturing and service UK SMEs. The study reports that public support increases the 
probability of introducing product or process innovations in UK SMEs. 
 In the context of SMEs, three studies have adopted an integrated approach to policy 
evaluation by assessing more than one type of additionality. First, Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 
(2014) investigate whether a direct financial support for R&D induces input and output 
additionality in Flemish SMEs. The results from caliper matching indicate positive 
additionality effects on both innovation input and output indicators. Similarly, Alecke et al. 
(2012) apply kernel matching to assess the effectiveness of public support among 
manufacturing and service SMEs in East Germany. The study reports input and output 
additionality effects, implying that subsidized firms are more R&D intensive than non-
subsidized firms and the probability of patent application is higher in subsidized than in non-
subsidized firms. Finally, Czarnitzki and Delanote (2015) report input and output additionality 
among independent, young SMEs in high-tech sectors in Germany. Their results indicate the 
largest treatment effects for this group of firms, relative to low-tech young firms and non-
independent counterparts. Thus, they conclude that the preferential treatment that policy 
makers provide to this category of firms is justifiable. 
Another dimension of policy mix is the multi-level governance of R&D and innovation 
programmes across Europe. Policy instruments in a policy mix could: i) be complementary; ii) 
be substitutes; or iii) not interact (Magro and Wilson 2013; Borrás and Edquist 2013; 
Cunningham et al. 2013a; OECD 2010; Vītola 2015). Moreover, Flanagan et al. (2011) and 
Cunningham et al. (2013a) identify four dimensions of policy mix interactions: policy space 
(when several policy instruments target the same group of firms); governance space (between 
different levels of governance); geographical space; and time. Our study fits into the second 
dimension of governance space, as our aim is to assess the interplay in policy mix at two 
governance levels: national and international. Across the EU, innovation policies are 
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implemented at regional, national and international levels (Magro and Wilson 2013; Vītola 
2015). Multi-level governance or coordination of policies at different administrative levels is 
underdeveloped, although their interdependence is often evident (OECD 2010).  
There are three main sources of international R&D programmes in the European Union: 
a) the Research Framework Programmes; b) the Cohesion Fund; and c) the Competitiveness 
and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) (Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 2014). The 
Research Framework Programmes (FPs) are focused on different thematic aspects and 
objectives with a common objective of fostering technological competitiveness in Europe. 
There have been eight editions up to date (FP1 to FP7 covering the period from 1984 to 2013, 
while FP8 is termed Horizon2020 and is effective from 2014 to 2020). In recent years, the main 
goal of FPs is the establishment of the European Research Area (Scherngell and Barber 2011). 
The Cohesion Fund Policy is a policy instrument designed to implement regional policy in the 
EU. In recent years, the emphasis has been placed on supporting depressed regions (Czarnitzki 
and Lopes-Bento 2014) in order to reduce economic and social disparities between Member 
States. Finally, the CIP covered the period 2007-2013 with SMEs as the main target. It 
consisted of three operational programmes focusing on innovation in SMEs (the 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme – EIP), the use of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) (the Information Communication Technologies Policy 
Support Programme – ICT-PSP), and on energy efficiency (the Intelligent Energy Europe 
Programme - IEE). This Instrument has been replaced by the Programme for the 
Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs (COSME), which runs from 2014 to 2020. In 
addition to EU programmes, there are a wide range of support programmes at national, regional 
and local levels.2 
Empirical evidence on potential complementarity effects between funding provided 
from different governance levels is particularly scarce (Vītola 2015). So far, only Czarnitzki 
and Lopes-Bento (2014) explored this issue empirically. They have taken into account what 
Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015) termed hidden treatment by distinguishing between national and 
EU funding sources, and estimating their individual as well as joint impact on innovation inputs 
and outputs in German firms. Our approach is similar to Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) 
with respect to the treatment of multi-level governance. The main differences are country 
                                                          
2Although restricted in scope to SMEs in traditional manufacturing industries, the FP7 GPrix project reported 
more than 400 innovation support programmes across the EU without any claim to being exhaustive (Radicic et 
al. 2015). 
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coverage (we have data for 28 European countries), our focus on SMEs and the choice of the 
matching estimator.  
 Concerning the country coverage, empirical studies are usually limited to one country, 
which restricts international comparison and consistent policy recommendations. 
Consequently, few studies evaluate the effectiveness of public support measures in more than 
one country (see e.g. Aerts and Schmidt 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 2012; Hewitt-
Dundas and Roper 2010), and even those that cover several countries are not specifically 
concerned with SMEs. Thus, by analysing firms from 28 European countries, our study 
contributes to a more comprehensive policy evaluation regarding this heterogeneous group of 
firms. Although the sample is too small to analyse each country separately, empirical findings 
for the whole sample of European SMEs provide at least tentative evidence on the effectiveness 
of national and international R&D programmes in stimulating SME innovation.  
Very few studies report empirical findings on the effectiveness of public support when 
the amounts of public support are available. Dai and Cheng (2015) analyse how public support 
affects innovation inputs in Chinese manufacturing firms. The study does not distinguish 
between national and international sources of subsidies. Their empirical findings reveal a non-
linear relationship between R&D subsidies and innovation inputs. More precisely, when the 
amount of public subsidy is beyond the optimal level, public support induces either partial or 
full crowding-out effects. Marino et al. (2016) also report a non-linear relationship between 
public subsidies and private R&D expenditure in French firms. Empirical evidence from a 
dose-response matching estimator indicates a crowding-out effect for medium-high levels of 
public subsidies. To our knowledge, no study explores output additionality in the case when 
doses of treatment are known. 
2.4. Hypotheses  
Given that the theoretical considerations about the effectiveness of public support on 
innovation inputs predict that both additionality and crowding-out effects are feasible and that 
empirical evidence on input additionality is mixed, we posit the following alternative 
hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of national and EU R&D programmes. 
H1A (H1B): National R&D programmes have a positive (negative) effect on  
innovation inputs (R&D employment and R&D expenditure). 
H2A (H2B):EU R&D programmes have a positive (negative) effect on innovation  
inputs (R&D employment and R&D expenditure). 
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Concerning the joint impact of both national and EU R&D programmes, theory 
suggests a higher joint impact than the impact of either national or EU programmes. Thus, we 
posit. 
H3: The joint impact of national and EU R&D programmes on innovation inputs is 
 larger than the impact of either national or EU R&D programmes in isolation.  
With respect to relative effects, the theoretical framework is lacking, while empirical evidence 
is scarce (the exception is Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 2014). Consequently, instead of 
hypotheses, we identify research questions. 
• What is the impact of EU programmes on innovation inputs relative to national 
programmes? 
• What is the impact of both national and EU programmes on innovation inputs 
relative to national programmes only? 
• What is the impact of both national and EU programmes on innovation inputs 
relative to EU programmes only? 
Each of these hypotheses and research questions regarding innovation inputs has its counterpart 
regarding innovation outputs.  
H4A (H4B): National R&D programmes have a positive (negative) effect on 
 innovation outputs (patents and innovative sales). 
H5A(H5B):EU R&D programmes have a positive (negative) effect on innovation  
outputs (patents and innovative sales). 
H6: The joint impact of national and EU R&D programmes on innovation outputs is 
 larger than the impact of either national or EU R&D programmes in isolation.  
And, with respect to relative effects: What is the impact of EU programmes on innovation 
outputs relative to national programmes? What is the impact of both national and EU 
programmes on innovation outputs relative to national programmes only? What is the impact 
of both national and EU programmes on innovation outputs relative to EU programmes only? 
3. Methodology  
 
3.1. Estimation of the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) effect 
 
Treatment assignment into support measures should be regarded as endogenous due to 
selection bias arising in the process of application and distribution of public measures, because 
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either: a) firms self-select themselves into programmes; and/or b) programme agencies adopt 
a “picking-the-winner” strategy during the selection process (Antonioli and Marzucchi 2012; 
Cerulli 2010; David et al. 2000; Grilli and Murtinu 2011). The corollary is that the effect of 
programme participation – the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) effect – must be 
estimated. In essentials, we follow the most common approach in this kind of research, which 
is to match by means of propensity scores supported (“treated”) firms to unsupported 
(“untreated”) firms with similar characteristics – which thus constitute a comparison group 3 – 
and then to estimate the difference between some outcome of interest (Y1) for participating 
firms and the outcome for non-participating firms (Y0) (Cerulli 2010).
4 To safely attribute the 
estimated difference to participation, the treated firms must be similar to the untreated firms in 
all respects except for participation. In turn, this depends on two identifying assumptions: the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA), or selection on observables, which posits that the 
outcome in the case of no treatment (Y0) is independent of treatment assignment (T), conditional 
on covariates X (Imbens 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009); and the overlap or common 
support condition, whereby the estimated propensity scores take positive values (Heckman and 
Vytilacil 2007). Regarding the selection of covariates X, the literature suggests that all observed 
variables that simultaneously affect treatment assignment and the outcome should be included 
in the estimation of propensity scores (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Steiner et al. 2010). 
Following Steiner et al. (2010), in situations when researchers have little or no information on 
the selection mechanism, the optimal modelling strategy is to include a large set of covariates, 
because this approach increases the probability of satisfying the assumption of selection on 
observables.    
We employ the inverse probability of treatment weighting regression adjustment 
(IPWRA) estimator. The IPWRA estimator belongs to a group of matching estimators that have 
the double-robust property. Double robustness implies that either the treatment model or the 
outcome model (or both) have to be correctly specified for the estimator to produce consistent 
treatment effects (Hirano et al. 2003). The main advantage of the IPWRA estimator is its double 
robust property. If either the propensity score model (the outcome model) or the treatment 
model is correctly specified, then this estimator will yield treatment effects with a lower bias 
than will other estimators that are not characterized by the double-robustness property. Busso 
et al. (2014) conducted a Monte Carlo simulation of the finite sample properties of a range of 
                                                          
3 We prefer the term “comparison” to “control” group, because the latter implies random allocation. 
4 In effect, the matching approach estimates the difference between firms in two states that cannot be observed 
simultaneously: the participation state; and the counterfactual state of non-participation. 
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matching and reweighting estimators – which include the IPWRA – in the estimation of ATTs. 
Their findings support our use of the IPWRA: first, we use normalised reweighting, which 
exhibits overt bias of the same magnitude as pair matching but much smaller variance; second, 
their findings suggest that normalised reweighting outperforms matching estimators when 
overlap is good, which is the case in our study (see Figure 1.). 
The estimator consists of three steps. First, the treatment model estimates, for each firm 
in the sample, the propensity score, which is the probability for each firm of participation 
(“treatment assignment”). Given that we evaluate multiple treatment effects, the propensity 
scores are estimated by a multinomial logit model, incorporating all four treatment levels: 
neither national nor EU R&D programmes; only national; only EU; and both. The choice of 
the model is motivated by the nature of our treatment variable, which has more than two 
outcomes with no natural ordering. The propensity scores enable firms to be matched within 
each treatment level. Second, regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) for 
each of our innovation variables in categorical form – R&D employment, R&D expenditure 
and Innovative sales – and by probit for our binary innovation variable Patents, in which the 
inverse of the estimated propensity scores are used as weights on covariates X and our 
treatment dummies.5 Third, from each of these regressions, the ATT effect is computed as the 
difference between the treatment and control group in the weighted averages of the predicted 
outcomes for each firm (for technical details see Wooldridge 2010). To take into account that 
various innovation support programmes are undertaken simultaneously, we estimate treatment 
effects in the multi-treatment context. Following Czarnitzki et al. (2007) and Guerzoni and 
Raiteri (2015), ATT effects are estimated for each treatment level, whereby treatment equal to 
zero denotes the absence of participation in either national or EU R&D programmes. This 
three-step approach provides consistent estimates given the underlying assumption of the 
independence of the treatment from the predicted outcomes once covariates are modelled in 
steps 1 and 2. We report valid standard errors (of the Huber/White/sandwich type) which take 
into account that the estimates are computed in a three-step approach (Emsley et al. 2008). 
 
3.2. Data 
                                                          
5 Strictly, OLS estimation is for continuous variables, whereas our categorical variable (with four or six ordinal 
categories) are treated as if they constitute a continuous variable. In this we follow established practice in other 
areas of economics – e.g. in the “economics of happiness”, the typical dependent variable is ‘life satisfaction, 
measured on an ordinal scale from 1 to 7… and is treated as a cardinal variable, as is common in the literature’ 
(Piper, 2015, p.56).  
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The dataset used in the analysis was gathered in 2010 within the MAPEER project 
commissioned by the European Commission’s DG-Research.6 The survey questionnaire 
covered the period 2005-2010. The sample includes 763 SMEs from 28 European countries. 
The survey was targeted to the population of SMEs with fewer than 250 employees and an 
annual turnover of less than 50 million Euros (EU definition of SMEs – Article 2 of the Annex 
of Recommendation 2003/361/EC) (European Commission 2005). Within the group, micro-
sized firms are defined as those with fewer than 10 employees, small firms with more than 10 
and fewer than 50 employees and medium-sized firms with more than 50 and fewer than 250 
employees. Due to missing values, the final sample consists of 671 SMEs (324 micro firms, 
218 small firms and 129 medium-sized firms). Given the small number of firms from individual 
countries, they were grouped into four categories based on the European Innovation Scoreboard 
(European Commission 2011) (see Appendix A.1 for the list of countries in each category):7 
- 'Innovation leaders', countries whose innovation performance is well above the EU27 
average. Our sample consists of 115 SMEs operating in four countries from this 
category.  
- 'Innovation followers', countries with performance close to the EU27 average (189 
firms in ten countries);  
- 'Moderate innovators', countries whose performance is below that of the EU27 average 
(260 firms in nine countries); and 
- 'Modest innovators', representing countries whose performance is well below that of 
the EU27 average (107 firms in five countries).  
 
As data are self-reported, common method variance, arising from the measurement method, 
could bias the estimates due to systematic measurement error (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). To 
check the internal validity of our data, we conducted Harmon's one-factor test (Podsakoff and 
Organ 1986). The test encompasses an explanatory factor analysis of all independent variables 
by using unrotated principle component factor analysis. When the common method bias is 
                                                          
6 For detailed information about the project, see http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/93511_en.html. 
7 The European Innovation Scoreboard publishes the average innovation performance of EU member states based 
on a composite indicator, consisting of 24 individual indicators. Innovation performance of each Member State is 
then compared to the average innovation performance of 27 EU Member States. For the purpose of this study, we 
use the Innovation Scoreboard from 2011, as it refers to innovation performance in the years 2009/2010. 
Moreover, as Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only country in the sample which is not a member state, its innovation 
performance was evaluated to be modest, based on its low Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D of 0.02 percent 
of GDP for 2009 (UNESCO data, http://data.uis.unesco.org/). 
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unlikely to occur, the first unrotated factor (i.e. the factor accounting for the largest share of 
the variance of the independent variables) should account for less than 50 per cent of the total 
variation in the other explanatory variables within the model. In our model, the first factor 
accounts for around 12 per cent of total variation, which suggests that common method bias 
raises no great concern in our model. 
The survey sample was obtained by the EU Framework 7 MAPEER project. Project 
members anticipated the practical difficulty – arising from previous experience – that it would 
be difficult to obtain large numbers of questionnaire responses from SMEs. Interview evidence 
gathered in the course of the project yielded several predictable findings in this regard, 
including: cultural barriers, especially among owners and managers of traditional-sector SMEs; 
owners and managers are too busy, typically having nobody to whom to delegate non-
essentials, which include completing questionnaires; and SME owners and managers dislike 
paperwork, including questionnaires.8 One corollary of the anticipated low response rate was 
the danger that a simple representative sample of SMEs would include insufficient programme 
participants for useful analysis. Accordingly, the project used a species of stratified sampling; 
i.e. a random sample biased in a deliberate way towards programme participants. To this end, 
a two-fold approach was implemented by project partners. First, to align the sample frame as 
closely as possible with the target population we used, wherever possible, lists of SMEs 
provided by general business or industry associations to approach firms by e-mail and web 
sites or, where this was the only alternative, by post. Secondly, to ensure a sufficient number 
of programme participants to be able to address the issue of interest (i.e. programme 
effectiveness), we enlisted the support of programme managers to send e-mails to all firms – 
i.e.  both participants and non-participants – who had applied for support in the sample period.  
This two-fold strategy succeeded in generating a sample with a reasonable balance between 
participants (58%) and non-participants (42%) as well as similar characteristics between 
participants and nonparticipants, except for innovation-related variables and innovation 
behaviour. Pleasingly, both participants and non-participants in support programmes have 
similar characteristics with respect to demographics and economic situation: the mean firm age 
in the sample is 10 years for participants and 9 years for non-participants; while the mean 
indices of competitive pressure for the two groups are, respectively, 3.72 and 3.89. While 
participants tend to be somewhat larger than non-participants, micro, small and medium firms 
                                                          
8 We found that even trade associations – i.e. organizations that SMEs have chosen to join – find it difficult to 
obtain information from their own SME members. 
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are well represented in both groups (respectively, 42% and 58%, 38% and 25%, and 21% and 
17%). (Of course, it is the role of matching to control for such differences when programme 
effects are estimated.) Conversely, as expected, there are differences between participants and 
non-participants in all categories of innovation and innovation-related variables (see Table 1). 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Finally, our sample is not only fit for the purpose of identifying programme effects, being 
reasonably well balanced between participants and non-participants with broadly similar 
demographic and market characteristics, but is also capable of yielding results of interest from 
a policy perspective. Given the sampling procedure outlined above, we are unable to assess the 
extent to which our sample is representative of European SMEs. We also recognise that the use 
of our findings to inform policy depends on their external validity. Yet, although we do not 
claim that our SME sample is representative of all European SMEs, we do claim that our 
sample is useful for informing policy. Indeed, even if a representative sample would have been 
feasible, we argue that it would not have been useful from a policy perspective. This issue has 
been recently confronted by Radicic et al. (2015, p.21) in an evaluation arising from a 
companion Framework 7 project employing the same approach to sampling:  
Edith Penrose’s classic The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959, p. 7), addressed a 
similar issue: “Many firms do not grow, and for a variety of reasons … I am not 
concerned with such firms, for I am only concerned with … those firms that do grow.” 
By analogy, policy makers are concerned to encourage innovative or potentially 
innovative SMEs to more fully exploit their innovative potential.  
In this study, our sample firms are mainly recent innovators (only 27% of participants and 
41% of non-participants are in the lowest category of zero to 10% of innovative sales – i.e. the 
percentage of total sales coming from new products or processes). As long as such firms are a 
priority for policy makers, then it is valid to use our results to inform policy. 
 
3.3. Model specification  
 
To estimate the individual and joint effects of national and EU R&D programmes, we create 
treatment variables with the following values: 
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- treatment=0 if a firm did not participate in national and EU R&D programmes from 
2005-2010 (281 firms); 
- treatment=1 if a firm participated only in national R&D programmes from 2005-2010 
(205 firms); 
- treatment=2 if a firm participated only in EU R&D programmes from 2005-2010 (50 
firms); 
- treatment=3 if a firm participated in both national and EU R&D programmes from 
2005-2010 (135 firms). 
 
Our measures of public support are dummy variables, rather than the values of the support. 
The overwhelming majority of published studies evaluating the effects of public support suffer 
from the same limitation; in the case of the large literature on R&D subsidy, this is documented 
by Dimos and Pugh (2016, pp.800 and 811) who also find that ‘using a binary indicator of 
subsidy – the typical practice in this literature – does not bias estimates in an upward direction’. 
The reasons for this practice apply with even greater force to studies of SMEs (Radicic et al. 
2015). Moreover, the dummy variable approach has the advantage in cross-country studies that 
it ‘helps avoid potential exchange rate and price-level problems across firms from different 
countries’ (Lee 2011, p.262). 
Two outcome variables are considered in assessing input additionality: a categorical 
variable R&D expenditure (as the share of total expenditure); and a categorical variable R&D 
employment (as the share of the number of employees). Output additionality is evaluated using 
two innovation output indicators: the variable Patents captures patent applications as a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the firm applied for patents either in the EU or in the US, and zero 
otherwise; and the categorical variable Innovative sales represents the share of sales coming 
from new products or processes.9 Innovative sales is the most frequently used measure of 
innovation output (Love et al. 2014). Innovative sales is a direct innovation output, while 
patents measure an intermediate innovation output (Clarysse et al. 2009; Pakes and Griliches 
1980). Both patents and innovative sales vary with firm size. Moreover, innovative sales may 
depend not only on innovation performance but also on market and competition conditions. 
Accordingly, our empirical models address these issues by controlling for firm size, industry 
                                                          
9 Three of these variables – R&D expenditures, R&D employment and patent applications – are used in Czarnitzki 
and Delonte (2015), while innovative sales is utilized in, for example, Aschhoff and Sofka (2009) and Czarnitzki 
and Lopes-Bento (2014). 
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heterogeneity and competitive pressure at firm level. Other measures of innovation output are 
the introduction of innovation (for example, whether the firm engages in product and/or process 
innovation) and the number of innovations (Acs and Audretsch 1988). However, the dataset at 
hand does not contain information on the introduction of innovations. 
Each of the Step 1 (treatment) and Step 2 (innovation) models in our three-step approach 
to estimating programme effects (see Section 3.1) includes the following control variables. 
Firms' absorptive capacity, as a key driver of successful innovation (Aschhoff and Sofka 2009; 
Cohen and Levinthal 1990), is measured by three variables. First, a binary variable R&D 
department is introduced to take into account firms' continuous R&D activities (Aschhoff and 
Sofka 2009). It takes a value of 1 if the firm has a separate R&D department, and zero 
otherwise. The presence of R&D departments has a positive relation with the likelihood of 
receiving a subsidy (Antonelli and Crespi 2013; Hussinger 2008). Second, the model 
specification includes two variables designed to capture firm-level quasi fixed effects (or initial 
conditions), which should control for time-invariant or slowly-moving unobserved 
characteristics with respect to innovation (Blundell et al. 1995; for recent applications see 
(Radicic et al. 2015); Czarnitzki and Delanote 2015; Hagedoorn and Wang 2012): Resources 
measures the resources invested in innovation in 2005 relative to 2009 (DV = 1 if the firm’s 
response to the question "Five years ago did you devote?" was 'Fewer resources to innovation'; 
= 0 if 'About the same' or 'More'); while Innovation capacity measures the firms' perceived 
innovation capacities within the industry in 2005 (DV = 1 for 'Above average' and 'Leading'; = 
0 for 'Average' and 'Lagging') (see Appendix A.1 for variable definitions). 
Other firm characteristics are captured by the following variables. Export is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm is engaged in exporting activities, and zero otherwise (Aerts 
and Schmidt 2008; Alecke et al. 2012; Antonelli and Crespi 2013; Arvanitis et al. 2010; 
Czarnitzki and Delonte 2015). Because the data are anonymized, we are not able to merge the 
MAPEER survey with other available datasets containing information about firms’ 
performance, such as productivity, profitability and rates of growth. Nonetheless, a recent 
strand of the international trade literature linking firm heterogeneity with respect to 
productivity and participation in foreign markets suggests that by controlling for firms’ 
exporting activities we are, in effect, controlling for productivity (Melitz 2003). As Greenaway 
and Kneller (2007) explain, high-productivity firms self-select into export markets compared 
to less productive firms, which resort to the domestic market. However, following Eßig and 
Glas (2016), we additionally control for firms’ turnover by specifying two binary variables: 
Turnover10mil is equal to 1 if the firm reported a turnover above 2 million Euros but less than 
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10 million Euros (and zero otherwise); and Turnovermorethan10mil is equal to 1 if the firm 
reported a turnover above 10 million Euros (and zero otherwise; the base category is turnover 
less than 2 million Euros). 
Firm size is taken into account by two dummy variables: Small firms, equal to one if 
the firm has more than 10 and less than 50 employees; and Medium firms, equal to one if the 
firm has more than 50 and less than 250 employees (Aerts and Schmidt 2008; Antonelli and 
Crespi 2013; Arvanitis et al. 2010; Aschhoff and Sofka 2009; Czarnitzki and Delonte 2015). 
Age measuring firm age (in natural logarithms) is included in the model as older firms might 
be less innovative and thus more reluctant to apply for R&D programmes than their younger 
counterparts (Alecke et al. 2012; Aschhoff and Sofka 2009; Czarnitzki and Delonte 2015). In 
contrast, younger firms might be more likely to apply for public support, because the problem 
of limited financial resources is more pronounced among these firms (Hottenrott and Lopes-
Bento 2014). Competitive intensity (Competition) is measured as a binary indicator equal to 
one if the firm reports that the competition is strong in its main markets, and zero otherwise. 
Sectoral heterogeneity is taken into account by creating six industry categories using the OECD 
(2006b) taxonomy: high tech; medium high tech; medium low tech; low tech; Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT); and service sectors (as the base category). Finally, the 
models include binary indicators for three country groups: Innovation leaders; Moderate 
innovators; and Modest innovators (Innovation followers is the base category), as noted in 
Section 3.2. 
Finally, models that evaluate output additionality include R&D expenditures as an 
additional matching variable. Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) note that the inclusion of the 
innovation input indicator, such as R&D expenditures, enables the matching algorithm to find 
suitable matches between firms at different treatment levels, but with the same level of 
investment in R&D expenditures.  
Appendix A.1 provides a detailed description of treatment, outcome and control 
variables. The modal firm has a share of R&D expenditures in total expenditures of between 
11 and 20 per cent. Similarly, the average share of R&D personnel in the total number of 
employees is between 11 and 20 per cent. Around a quarter (24 per cent) of firms applied for 
patents, either in the EU or in the US. Two thirds of firms are exporters, while, on average, 
firms experience weak to moderate competitive pressure. The average age of firms in the 
sample is 10 years. More than a third of firms have a separate R&D department (39 per cent). 
Almost half of firms invested more resources in innovation in 2010 than five years earlier (43 
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per cent), whereas 23 per cent of firms had a past innovation capacity self-reported to be leading 
or above average in their industry. 
 
4. Main empirical results 
 
The correlation matrix showing the Pearson correlation coefficients among the 
independent variables is presented in Appendix A.2. The correlations are overall low to 
moderate suggesting that multicollinearity is minimal. Table 2 reports results from one output 
variable, as an example; namely, from the multinomial logit model of R&D employment, in 
which the base is treatment at level 0 (no participation in national and EU R&D programmes).10 
Table 2 also reports the treatment (selection) model, which is the same for all outcome 
variables. The treatment model shows the effects of covariates on the probabilities of different 
levels of treatment, while the outcome model estimates the impact of covariates on some 
particular innovation indicator (in Table 2, R&D employment). The coefficients in the models 
are not of interest in themselves, as the purpose of specifying the model is to facilitate the 
estimation of treatment effects (Cattaneo et al. 2013). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Appendix A.3 shows the common support regions at different levels of treatment. 
Treatment effects of any matching estimator based on the propensity score are only estimated 
in the region of common support (see Section 3.1). Thus, it is necessary to check the overlap 
of the propensity scores at different treatment levels. The overlap plots, reported in Appendix 
A.3, reveals that the predicted probabilities are not concentrated near 0 or 1, which implies that 
the overlap assumption is not violated (Cattaneo et al. 2013). 
Table 3 shows the absolute and relative ATTs from the IPWRA estimator for all four 
outcome variables. Absolute effects represent effects of different treatment levels when the 
base is treatment 0 (no participation in either national or EU programmes), while relative 
effects compare the effectiveness of different treatment levels, other than level 0 (Flanagan et 
al. 2011). First, we consider our two innovation inputs. Receiving support from either national 
or EU sources or both, relative to non-treated firms, has a positive and highly statistically 
                                                          
10 Results for the other multinomial logit models (with the other outcome variables) are not reported but are 
available on request. 
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significant effects on R&D employment (Columns 1, 2 and 3). Therefore, we have sufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of crowding-out from both national and EU R&D 
programmes on R&D employment. In addition, their joint effect is larger than their individual 
effects suggesting a complementary effect of both sources together. To quantitatively interpret 
the estimated treatment effects for the continuous outcome variables (R&D employment, R&D 
expenditure and Innovative sales), we estimated the means of the predicted outcomes for each 
treatment level for the comparison group and calculated the differences between the percentage 
changes of the estimated ATTs and of the means of the predicted outcomes for the comparison 
group. The results are reported in Table 4 (only statistically significant differences in the 
percentage changes are presented). SMEs that participated in national support programmes 
have a 22.3 percentage points higher share of R&D employment than non-participating firms 
(Column 1), while those firms that received EU support have a 41.4 percentage points higher 
share of R&D employment than non-participating firms (Column 2). A similar percentage point 
change is found in SMEs that received support from both sources (Column 3); namely, those 
firms have a 45.4 percentage points higher share of R&D employment than firms that have not 
been supported from either source. Regarding relative effects, firms that received support from 
both sources have a 20.2 percentage points higher share of R&D employment than firms that 
have been supported by national programmes (Column 5).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Focusing on the second measure of innovation input (R&D expenditure), firms 
supported from national programmes have a 16.2 percentage points higher share of R&D 
expenditure relative to firms without any public support (Column 1), while this effect is much 
higher for EU support (42 percentage points, Column 2) as well as for support from both 
sources (33.5 percentage points, Column 3). Regarding relative effects, EU support is 
marginally more effective than national support; firms that received EU support have a 15 
percentage points higher share of R&D expenditure compared to firms that received national 
support (Column 4). In addition, receiving support from both sources relative to national 
support (Column 5) increases the share of R&D expenditure by 20.7 percentage points. 
Therefore, the results for both input measures – R&D employment and R&D 
expenditure – reject crowding-out effects from either national or EU R&D programmes 
considered separately, thus supporting hypotheses H1A and H2A, while suggesting a larger 
effect from EU than from national programmes (Column 4) as well as from both levels jointly 
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compared to national support in isolation (Column 5). Nonetheless, hypothesis H3 can be 
rejected for both R&D employment and R&D expenditure, as the joint impact of both sources 
(Column 3) is the same as the impact of EU support in isolation (Column 2) (the difference 
between the percentage changes in the ATTs is not statistically significant at any conventional 
level). 
Next we consider the findings on our two measures of innovation output, patents and 
innovative sales. Our results are qualitatively the same for both indicators. Receiving EU 
support reduces the probability of patent application by 11.3 percentage points relative to 
receiving no support (Column 2, Table 3), thus supporting hypothesis H4B, and by 12.5 
percentage points relative to receiving national support only (Column 4, Table 3).11 In contrast, 
participating in both national and EU support programmes increases the probability of patent 
application by 28.1 percentage points compared to EU support in isolation (Column 6, Table 
3). For innovative sales as an innovation output indicator, two effects are statistically 
significant. First, receiving EU support reduces innovative sales by 18.3 percentage points 
compared to those firms with no support (Column 2, Table 4), thus supporting hypothesis H5B, 
whereas receiving support from both sources relative to EU support (Column 6, Table 4) 
increases innovative sales by 26.2 percentage points. In other words, adding national support 
to EU support more than offsets the crowding out effect associated with EU support, whereas 
adding EU support to national support makes no significant difference (Column 5, Table 4). 
Finally, hypothesis H6 is rejected, as the joint impact of both sources is not larger than the 
impacts of national and EU support programmes in isolation (Column 3, Table 3). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Our findings on input additionality corroborate the findings from previous evaluations 
of R&D and innovation policy for SMEs (e.g. Alecke et al. 2012; Czarnitzki and Delanote 
2015; Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2014). Concerning output additionality, our findings are 
weaker with respect to the impact of either national or EU R&D programmes in isolation on 
patent applications and the commercial success of innovation, although we find that national 
support has a strongly positive effect when added to EU support. The relative weakness of 
these output effects is consistent with Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) who found no 
absolute effects of national and EU funding on innovative sales in German firms (although 
their study is not focused on SMEs). They suggest that a potential explanation for this finding 
                                                          
11 For patents the Table 3 effects are direct percentage point measures. Hence, they do not figure in Table 4. 
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could be due to the temporal effects of public funding, i.e. it could be that the effects on the 
commercialization of innovation occur over the long-run. However, although our investigation 
is limited by cross-sectional data, the underlying survey questions were framed to capture at 
least some changes taking place over time. Accordingly, respondents were asked (in 2010): 
‘What proportion of your current sales comes from new or substantially improved products or 
processes introduced since 2005?’ Hence, while output effects from recent R&D support might 
not yet have had sufficient time to be manifested by the time of interview, output effects from 
support earlier in our period of interest had had sufficient time to come to the notice of senior 
management. Hence, unlike Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) who find no output effects, we 
are able to detect some economically substantial and statistically significant output effects. 
Nonetheless, it is likely that we capture output effects less completely than either input effects 
(R&D employment and expenditure) or intermediate outputs (patents). This potentially 
weakens comparison between input, intermediate and output effects – which may appear with 
different lags – but does not necessarily impair comparison between the effects of support from 
different administrative levels.   
Our focus on the differential effects of support from EU and national levels is consistent 
with Vītola (2015) who notes that most international R&D programmes stipulate that SMEs 
engage in international R&D cooperation, while programmes at national level have a wider 
range of policy instruments. For interpreting our results, one of her conclusions is particularly 
suggestive; namely, that policy measures at national and international levels differ as they 
‘target specific phases of development’ (Vītola 2015, p. 109). This again raises the importance 
of the timing of R&D support effects. It is possible that national support yields direct 
commercial benefits within the range of our sample, whereas EU support yields indirect 
behavioural benefits – via enhanced cooperation – manifested only over periods exceeding the 
reach of our sample. To investigate this possibility would require longitudinal data over 
considerable periods.   
An additional reason why output effects are less prominent in the literature is suggested 
by Belitz and Lejpras (2016) who found in the German context that those SMEs intensively 
participating in R&D programmes are not profiting from innovation. One explanation of this 
finding is that the German government is liberal in providing support to SMEs without a proven 
track record.  
 
4.1. Robustness check 
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 For a robustness check, we apply 1:4 Nearest Neighbour (NN) matching with the 
Mahalanobis metric. Nearest Neighbour (NN) matching is the most commonly used matching 
estimator in the innovation literature (Czarnitzki et al. 2007). The propensity score can be used 
to construct matched pairs applying three methods (Guo and Fraser 2010): i) nearest neighbour 
matching on the estimated propensity score; ii) Mahalanobis metric matching including the 
estimated propensity score; and iii) nearest Mahalanobis metric matching with calipers based 
on the propensity score. The third method is superior to others with respect to balancing the 
covariates between a treatment and comparison group (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). To be 
able to compare the results from a robustness check with our main results, we do not apply the 
third method, because the use of the caliper would reduce the sample on which the treatment 
effects are estimated. Thus, we opted for the second method.  
 In addition, we estimated the 1:4 NN estimator, whereby 1:4 refers to the number of 
control units used in matching (i.e. four control units were used to match each treated unit). 
Selecting multiple controls entails a bias-variance trade-off; multiple matches increase bias but 
reduce variance. The literature does not provide guidelines on how to choose an optimal 
number of matches (Huber et al. 2010). Following Abadie et al. (2004), we used four matches, 
as ‘it offers the benefit of not relying on too little information without incorporating 
observations that are not sufficiently similar’ (p. 298). 
 The results from NN matching (Table 5) are not only qualitatively the same as the 
main results but also quantitatively similar (with the exception of innovative sales). Unlike the 
main results where we reported two statistically significant results for innovative sales 
(Columns 2 and 6, Table 3), these treatment effects are statistically insignificant when NN 
matching is estimated. However, these discrepancies do not alter our main conclusions 
regarding the lack of output additionality and the continuing presence of the “European 
Paradox”: in particular, the crowding out of patents associated with EU support in isolation 
(Column 2, Table 5) is again more than offset by the addition of national support; while the 
same effect is indicated for innovative sales (Column 5, Table 5), even though these estimates 
are not statistically significant at conventional levels. In addition, the main advantage of the 
IPWRA estimator (its double robustness property) suggests that, when the true propensity score 
model is unknown (the most common case in practice), but if either the propensity score model 
or the outcome model are correctly specified, then the estimated treatment effects are unbiased. 
In contrast, this double robustness is not a feature of NN matching. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
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5. Conclusions and policy implications  
 
 Innovation is centre stage in both national and EU policies. Public policy in support of 
innovation in SMEs is widespread at all administrative levels. This study empirically assesses 
whether national and international (EU) R&D programmes induce input and output 
additionality in European SMEs. In this respect, it follows the recent trend of systematic policy 
evaluation by assessing two categories of additionality while taking into account the interplay 
between R&D policies at different governance levels. The empirical strategy takes into account 
the presence of hidden treatment, whereby firms can participate in either national or EU R&D 
programmes or both. By estimating treatment effects for different administrative levels 
together with multi-level governance (receipt of programmes at both national and EU levels), 
we can make inferences about potential complementary effects between R&D programmes 
conducted at two administrative levels. Table 6 summarises our findings: absolute effects refer 
to national and EU programmes in isolation, as well as to their joint effects, in each case relative 
to “no support”; relative effects measure national and EU support effects in relation to each 
other. Our discussion in the preceding Section indicates that these findings are both plausible 
and economically substantial (i.e. neither too large to be implausible nor too small to be of no 
policy interest). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
National and EU R&D programmes are effective in increasing firms’ innovation inputs 
both in isolation (Columns 1 and 2) and jointly (Column 3). However, compared to national 
support in isolation, EU support is more effective in raising R&D expenditure (Column 4), 
while for both R&D employment and R&D expenditure, national and EU support are more 
effective jointly than national support in isolation (Column 5). From the perspective of 
increasing innovation inputs, firms benefit from participating in both national and international 
programmes compared to those firms that participate only in national ones. However, this 
contrasts with our findings for innovation outputs. In isolation, national support has no effect 
(Column 1), EU support leads to crowding out (Column 2), and both together have no effect 
(Column 3). Yet, for both patents and innovative sales, the addition of national support to EU 
support eliminates the crowding-out effect of EU support in isolation (Column 6). Together, 
this evidence suggests that the “European paradox” applies not only to firms generally but also 
to SMEs in particular; namely, EU support in isolation promotes innovation inputs but not 
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innovation outputs. The persistence of this effect is highlighted by the attempts of policy 
makers at national and EU levels to design measures to mitigate the gap since recognising this 
paradox some twenty years ago.  
While our results provide direct information, they provide only indirect evidence on 
policy instruments. Nonetheless, our evidence is consistent with the view that supply-side 
support measures of the type provided at EU and national levels are not effective individually 
in assisting SMEs to realise innovation outputs. In turn, our evidence provides impetus for the 
growing emphasis on demand-side support measures. Demand-side policy instruments have 
been mostly neglected in innovation policy (Crespi and Quatraro 2013) but, in recent years, 
they are regaining the attention of policy makers, researchers and the business community 
(Borrás and Edquist 2013), particularly with respect to identifying an appropriate vehicle for 
supporting SME innovation. Our study provides evidence consistent with increased provision 
of this type of innovation policy in the SME context.12 Furthermore, with respect to particular 
innovation policy instruments, Aschoff and Sofka (2009) found that firms with limited 
resources, such as small firms, could particularly benefit from public procurement in the 
domain of market success of innovation. 
 Finally, this study offers new insights into R&D policy effectiveness in European 
SMEs, but it also has a few limitations. The most important limitation arises from the timing 
of support effects. First, input, intermediate and output effects are likely to occur over different 
periods with the corollary that these support effects are not equally represented in the sample 
which, in turn, may impair our comparisons between these different effects of support 
programmes. Second, if national support programmes yield direct relatively rapid commercial 
benefits, while EU support yields indirect behavioural benefits arising over long periods, then 
our comparisons between the effects of support from different administrative levels may 
likewise be impaired.  In spite of survey questions designed to capture effects over time, these 
limitations reflect the type of data typically available to researchers, in particular those 
concerned with SMEs. In general, the lack of longitudinal data prevents empirical studies of 
medium- and long-term impacts of public interventions (Alecke et al. 2012; Antonelli and 
Crespi 2013; Clarysse et al. 2009; Grilli and Murtinu 2011). Moreover, the availability of panel 
                                                          
12 Cornet et al. (2006) evaluated the effectiveness of a Dutch innovation voucher programme for SMEs, finding 
that 8 out of 10 vouchers were used to introduce innovations which, without public support, would not have been 
realized. This is a very large treatment effect, especially given that empirical studies, if reporting additionality at 
all, typically report small programme effects (Radicic et al. 2015). Secondly, the UK’s National Endowment for 
Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA) had trialled a voucher programme to support SME purchases of 
creative services with similarly large treatment effects (Bakhshi et al. 2015). 
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data would enable the application of estimators that take into account simultaneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity arising from participation in public support measures. A second 
limitation, from the perspective of systemic policy evaluations, is that our data precludes the 
investigation of other types of additionality, such as behavioural additionality and cognitive 
capacity additionality (Falk 2007; Knockaert et al. 2014). Third, our sample is relatively small 
thus preventing the analysis of additionality effects at the individual country level. Finally, 
similar to the questionnaire designed for the Community Innovation Survey, we do not have 
any detailed information about the forms and objectives of the individual national and 
international R&D programmes in which firms participated. Thus, our conclusions cannot be 
applied to any specific R&D programme, but are general and should be interpreted conditional 
on the analysed dataset (see e.g. Herrera and Sánchez-Gonzáles 2012). Despite these 
limitations, our study echoes the conclusion in Cunningham et al. (2013a, p. 35): ‘Even with 
improved evaluations, thinking about systemic effects will have to be done with limited 
evidence and in conditions of uncertainty – but it should be attempted nevertheless.’  
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Table 1. Mean values of the independent variables for participating and non-
participating firms. 
 
Independent variables Participants 
Non-
participants 
R&D personnel  2.460 1.571 
R&D expenditure  2.343 1.530 
Patents  0.304 0.139 
Innovative sales 3.698 3.077 
Export  0.742 0.526 
Turnover10million 0.251 0.188 
Turnovermorethan10mill 0.084 0.059 
Age  2.322 2.208 
Competition  3.716 3.892 
Innovation capacity 0.279 0.164 
Resources  0.488 0.348 
R&D department 0.522 0.213 
Micro firms 0.419 0.582 
Small firms 0.376 0.247 
Medium firms 0.205 0.171 
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Table 2. Estimation functions (the outcome and the treatment models) for the outcome variable R&D employment with treatment level 0 
as the base (reference) category.  
 
Independent variables  
Outcome models Treatment model 
Potential 
-outcome 
model for 
treatment 
=0 
Potential 
-outcome 
model for 
treatment 
=1 
Potential 
-outcome 
model for 
treatment 
=2 
Potential 
-outcome 
model for 
treatment 
=3 
Treatment 
=1 
Treatment 
=2 
Treatment 
=3 
Export 0.266* 0.218 0.188 -0.260 0.418* 1.107*** 1.094*** 
 (0.154) (0.164) (0.238) (0.207) (0.222) (0.407) (0.306) 
Age -0.233** -0.288*** 0.008 -0.052 0.007 0.151 0.254* 
 (0.096) (0.092) (0.166) (0.137) (0.125) (0.196) (0.142) 
Turnover between two and ten million 0.088 -0.112 -0.785* -0.764*** 0.253 0.846* -0.059 
 (0.237) (0.218) (0.421) (0.287) (0.341) (0.483) (0.365) 
Turnover more than ten million 0.097 -0.517* -2.271*** -1.112** 0.625 0.542 0.103 
 (0.269) (0.272) (0.779) (0.436) (0.551) (0.798) (0.610) 
Competition  -0.065 -0.051 -0.328*** 0.039 -0.357*** -0.130 -0.255** 
 (0.064) (0.075) (0.090) (0.116) (0.108) (0.164) (0.124) 
Innovation capacity 0.341* 0.675*** 0.141 0.264 0.273 1.164*** 1.063*** 
 (0.179) (0.168) (0.248) (0.207) (0.273) (0.368) (0.294) 
Resources  0.146 -0.111 -0.335 0.067 0.765*** 0.395 1.000*** 
 (0.123) (0.142) (0.267) (0.193) (0.219) (0.335) (0.253) 
R&D department 0.562*** 0.575*** -0.116 0.866*** 1.194*** 0.257 0.949*** 
 (0.161) (0.152) (0.195) (0.194) (0.228) (0.391) (0.259) 
Small firms -0.589*** -0.591*** 0.630*** -0.265 0.397 -0.136 0.886*** 
 (0.181) (0.198) (0.218) (0.221) (0.267) (0.461) (0.317) 
Medium firms -0.512** -0.472 -0.079 -0.243 -0.310 -0.492 0.431 
 (0.255) (0.318) (0.383) (0.332) (0.426) (0.665) (0.499) 
Industry dummies Included  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country group dummies  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 2.018*** 2.943*** 4.065*** 2.501*** -0.630 -3.881*** -4.486*** 
 (0.517) (0.386) (0.873) (0.780) (0.617) (1.009) (0.889) 
No of observations 671       
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 3. Estimated Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATTs) using the IPWRA 
estimator. 
Outcome 
variables  
Absolute treatment effects Relative treatment effects 
National 
support 
versus  
no support 
EU support 
versus  
no support 
Both 
sources 
versus  
no support 
EU 
support 
versus 
national 
support 
Both 
sources 
versus 
national 
support 
Both 
sources 
versus  
EU 
support 
 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  
R&D 
employment  
0.414*** 
(0.100) 
0.755*** 
(0.163) 
0.842*** 
(0.110) 
0.184 
(0.195) 
0.471*** 
(0.117) 
0.021 
(0.143) 
R&D 
expenditure 
0.300*** 
(0.100) 
0.740*** 
(0.165) 
0.645*** 
(0.109) 
0.326* 
(0.185) 
0.440*** 
(0.107) 
-0.065 
(0.131) 
Patents  
0.032 
(0.049) 
-0.113* 
(0.060) 
0.036 
(0.078) 
-0.125** 
(0.061) 
0.041 
(0.058) 
0.281*** 
(0.061) 
Innovative sales 
-0.210 
(0.204) 
-0.756** 
(0.367) 
-0.306 
(0.277) 
-0.542 
(0.361) 
-0.024 
(0.243) 
0.801*** 
(0.303) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. Percentage changes relative to the base-level predicted outcomes. 
Outcome 
variables 
Absolute treatment effects Relative treatment effects 
National 
support 
versus  
no 
support 
EU support 
versus  
no support 
Both 
sources 
versus  
no 
support 
EU 
support 
versus 
national 
support 
Both 
sources 
versus 
national 
support 
Both 
sources 
versus  
EU support 
 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  
R&D 
employment  
0.223*** 
(0.060) 
0.414*** 
(0.099) 
0.454*** 
(0.073) 
- 
0.202*** 
(0.071) 
- 
R&D 
expenditure 
0.162*** 
(0.060) 
0.420*** 
(0.104) 
0.335*** 
(0.068) 
0.150* 
(0.089) 
0.207*** 
(0.056) 
- 
Innovative 
sales 
- 
-0.183** 
(0.082) 
- - - 
0.262** 
(0.118) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5. Estimated Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATTs) using 1:4 Nearest 
Neighbour (NN) matching. 
Outcome 
variables  
Absolute treatment effects Relative treatment effects 
National 
support 
versus  
no support 
EU 
support 
versus  
no support 
Both 
sources 
versus  
no 
support 
EU 
support 
versus 
national 
support 
Both 
sources 
versus 
national 
support 
Both 
sources 
versus  
EU 
support 
 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  
R&D 
employment  
0.488*** 
(0.142) 
0.885*** 
(0.204) 
0.893*** 
(0.158) 
0.205 
(0.217) 
0.311** 
(0.145) 
-0.109 
(0.215) 
R&D 
expenditure 
0.378*** 
(0.134) 
0.910*** 
(0.204) 
0.737*** 
(0.131) 
0.180 
(0.215) 
0.231* 
(0.135) 
0.007 
(0.215) 
Patents  
0.067 
(0.048) 
-0.095* 
(0.057) 
0.063 
(0.106) 
-0.135* 
(0.075) 
0.050 
(0.064) 
0.200** 
(0.083) 
Innovative sales 
-0.112 
(0.245) 
-0.330 
(0.361) 
0.276 
(0.418) 
-0.465 
(0.389) 
-0.139 
(0.288) 
0.485 
(0.398) 
Notes: Abadie-Imbens (2006) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6. Summary of findings. 
Outcome 
variables  
Absolute effects: national and EU programmes in 
isolation and jointly 
Relative effects: national and EU effects in relation to each 
other 
National support 
versus no 
support 
EU support 
versus no 
support 
Both sources 
versus no 
support 
EU support 
versus national 
support 
Both sources versus 
national support 
Both sources 
versus EU 
support 
 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  
R&D 
employment 
Crowding out 
rejected 
Crowding out 
rejected 
Crowding out 
rejected 
No difference 
Higher effect from 
both sources jointly 
than from national 
support in isolation 
No difference 
R&D 
expenditure 
Crowding out 
rejected 
Crowding out 
rejected 
Crowding out 
rejected 
Higher effect of 
EU than national 
supporta 
Higher effect from 
both sources jointly 
than from national 
support in isolation 
No difference 
Patents  No effect   
Crowding out 
not rejected a 
No effect   
Lower effect of 
EU than national 
support a  
No difference 
Higher effect: 
crowding out 
from EU support 
eliminated by 
combination with 
national support 
Innovative 
sales 
No effect   
Crowding out  
not rejected 
No effect 
Lower effect of 
EU than national 
supporta 
No difference 
Higher effect: 
crowding out 
from EU support 
eliminated by 
combination with 
national support 
Note: a At the 10% level. 
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Appendix A1. Variable definition and descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation). 
Variables Variable construction Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Treatment variable    
Treatment  =0 if a firm did not participate in national and international R&D programmes  
=1 if a firm only participated in national R&D programmes  
=2 if a firm only participated in international R&D programmes  
1.058 1.139 
 =3 if a firm participated in both national and international R&D programmes   
Outcome variables    
R&D expenditure (share of R&D expenditure in total 
expenditures) 
Categorical variable =1 if the share is 0-10 %;  =2 if the share is 11-20%; =3 if 
the share is 21-50 %; =4 if the share is >50% 
2.003 1.116 
R&D employment (share of R&D personnel in total number 
of employees) 
Categorical variable =1 if the share is 0-10 %;  =2 if the share is 11-20%; =3 if 
the share is 21-50 %; =4 if the share is >50% 
2.088 1.201 
Patents DV=1 if a firm applied for either EU or US patents; zero otherwise  0.237 0.426 
Innovative sales - share of sales from new products and 
processes  
Categorical variable =1 if the share is 0-10 %;  =2 if the share is 11-20%; =3 if 
the share is 21-30 %; =4 if the share is 31-40%; =5 if the share is 41-50%;  =6 if 
the share is >50% 
3.456 2.146 
Control variables    
Degree of internationalization (Export) DV=1 if a firm engages in exporting activities; zero otherwise 0.653 0.476 
The age of firm (Age) Natural logarithm of firm age in the reference year (the reference year is either 
2008, 2009 or 2010) 
2.274 0.971 
Firm’s turnover (Turnover less than two million) (base 
category) 
DV=1 if a firm reported turnover that is less than 2 million Euros in the reference 
year; zero otherwise  
0.699 0.459 
Firm’s turnover (Turnover between two and ten million) DV=1 if a firm reported turnover that is larger than 2 million and smaller than 10 
million Euros in the reference year; zero otherwise 
0.227 0.419 
Firm’s turnover (Turnover more than ten million) DV=1 if a firm reported turnover that is larger than 10 million Euros in the 
reference year; zero otherwise 
0.074 0.263 
Competitive pressure (Competition) Categorical variable =1 if the response was 'Very weak'; =2 if the response was 
'Weak'; =3 if the response was 'Moderate; =4 if the response was 'Strong'; =5 if a 
firm responded 'Very strong' to the question "How would you judge the 
competition in your main market(s)" 
3.791 1.018 
Existence of a separate R&D department (R&D department) DV=1 if a firm has a separate R&D department; zero otherwise  0.393 0.489 
Resources devoted to innovation (Resources) DV=1 if a firm’s response to the question "Five years ago did you devote?" was 
'Fewer resources to innovation'; = 0 if 'About the same' or 'More'. 
0.426 0.495 
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Past innovation capacity relative to competitors (Innovation 
capacity) 
DV = 1 if a firm's innovation capacities within the industry in 2005 was 'Above 
average' and 'Leading'; = 0 for 'Average' and 'Lagging' 
0.231 0.422 
Micro firms  DV=1 if a firm has fewer than 10 employees; zero otherwise  0.483 0.500 
Small firms  DV=1 if a firm has more than 10 and fewer than 50 employees; zero otherwise  0.325 0.469 
Medium firms  DV=1 if a firm has more than 50 and fewer than 250 employees; zero otherwise 0.192 0.394 
'Innovation leaders', that is, countries whose performance is 
well above the EU27 average (Leaders) 
DV=1 if countries are Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden; zero otherwise 0.171 0.377 
'Innovation followers', that is, countries whose performance is 
close to that of the EU27 average (Followers) (base category) 
DV=1 if countries are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovenia and the United Kingdom; zero otherwise  
 
0.282 0.450 
'Moderate innovators', that is, countries whose performance is 
below that of the EU27 average (Moderate) 
DV=1 if countries are Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia and Spain; zero otherwise 
0.387 0.488 
'Modest innovators', that is, countries whose performance is 
well below that of the EU27 average (Modest) 
DV=1 if countries are Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; zero otherwise  
0.159 0.366 
High-technology industries  DV=1 if a firm operates in high-technology intensive industries; zero otherwise 
(NACE classification rev 1.1) 
0.183 0.387 
Medium high-technology industries DV=1 if a firm operates in medium high-technology intensive industries; zero 
otherwise 
0.130 0.336 
Medium low-technology industries  DV=1 if a firm operates in medium low-technology intensive industries; zero 
otherwise  
0.133 0.339 
Low-technology industries  DV=1 if a firm operates in low-technology intensive industries; zero otherwise  0.155 0.362 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industries  DV=1 if a firm operates in ICT industries; zero otherwise  0.203 0.402 
Service sectors  DV=1 if a firm operates in service industries; zero otherwise (base category) 0.197 0.398 
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Appendix A2. The correlation matrix. 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Export 1.000         
2.Age  0.063 1.000        
3.Turnover between 
two and ten 
0.073* 0.273*** 1.000      
 
4.Turnover more than 
ten 
0.088** 0.269*** -0.154*** 1.000     
 
5.Competition 0.026 0.115*** 0.118*** 0.014 1.000     
6.Innovation capacity 0.132*** -0.082** -0.052 -0.034 -0.107*** 1.000    
7.Resources  0.021 -0.021 0.023 -0.015 0.112*** -0.086** 1.000   
8.R&D department 0.222*** 0.072* 0.118*** 0.155*** 0.003 0.116*** 0.114*** 1.000  
9.R&D expenditure 0.193*** -0.245*** -0.142*** -0.128*** -0.148*** 0.063 0.281*** 0.359*** 1.000 
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Appendix A3. Checking the overlap assumption (the common support region). 
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